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Abstract Employing the distinction between the authoritarian (based on coercion) and the
authoritative (based on excellence), this study of the understanding of authority in the
Analects argues against interpretations of Confucianism which cast Confucius himself as
advocating authoritarianism. Passages with key notions such as shang 上 and xia 下; fu 服
and cong 從; quan 權 and wei 威, are analyzed to illuminate ideas of hierarchy, obedience,
and the nature of authority itself in the text. The evidence pieced together reveals the Master
to be authoritative rather than authoritarian; and the social order to which he aspired is one
based on excellence rather than on coercion. The article then considers why teachings
which present a model of authority as authoritative ended up as often identified with
authoritarianism and concludes with some thoughts about how Confucianism might be
rescued from authoritarian practice.
Keywords Authority . Hierarchy . Obedience . Confucian politics . Theory and practice
1 Introduction
Confucianism has often been treated as an authoritarian philosophy that exalts the absolute
authority of rulers over subjects, of fathers over sons, and of husbands over wives. That is
the imperial orthodoxy that historically passed for “Confucianism” and has been blamed for
China’s backwardness, which led to many humiliating defeats in its encounter with Western
modernity. Recent works on the philosophical possibility of Confucian democracy have
argued that authoritarian interpretations of Confucianism misunderstand the nature of
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authority in the teachings of Master Kong (Kongzi 孔子, better known as Confucius in
the West).1 Using the contrast between “authoritarian” and “authoritative,” my previous
work, Confucian Democracy, tried to show that ideal authority in Confucianism is non-
coercive: “Coercion is a failure of authority as the authoritative” (TAN Sor-hoon 2004: 194).
In contrast, the authoritarian is inherently coercive. The paradigm of the authoritative in the
Analects is the figure of the teacher who embodies tradition, while the despot who wields
absolute power over others is authoritarian. In the chapter contributed to a recent volume on
Confucian Cultures of Authority, Henry Rosemont, Jr.’s critique of Western liberalism for
its failure to provide adequate answers to world-wide social injustice also employs a
distinction between the authoritarian—coercion or threats based on strength or power—and
the authoritative—persuasion based on knowledge and reason (Rosemont 2006: 1).
In Authority and Democracy, April Carter presents a more detailed analysis of the
ambiguity and complexity of the nature of authority indicated by these two adjectives. For
her, the “authoritarian” describes hierarchical authority which “entails belief in the right of
those in superior positions to give orders to those below them, a right which is inherent in
the very fact of social hierarchy, although it may be justified in addition by appeal to
tradition, religion or the order of the universe” (Carter 1979: 6). Such authority relations
found in traditional hierarchical societies, such as aristocratic societies, “are necessarily
based on social and economic coercion and often entail the use of considerable force”
(Carter 1979: 6). However, the alternative model of authority, the authoritative, is also
found in aristocratic society. This is “the authority of wisdom, learning or skill,” voluntarily
obeyed and freely accepted (Carter 1979: 6–7). Carter defines authority “in contradistinc-
tion to force” while recognizing that “being in authority implies two different kinds of
relationship: a pure authority which can evoke willing compliance, and a power to
command and enforce obedience” (Carter 1979: 14). Her study argues that although some
form of authority is necessary in the relation between adult and child, teacher and student,
professional and layman, it may be abused or insufficiently authoritative. Autocratic rule,
the authoritarian model of authority, is necessary to neither economic nor political society.
Although direct democracy and anarchism may be incompatible even with the authoritative,
Carter allows for professional authority in her approach to democracy.
2 Hierarchical Authority in China
Many would point out that throughout most of its history China fits the model of an
aristocratic society, and that even the social order of the “three dynasties” (Xia 夏,
Shang 商, and Zhou 周) that Master Kong praised was inherently hierarchical. The
Analects often compares sociopolitical positions in terms of shang 上 and xia 下, that is,
above and below, high(er) and low(er), or superior and inferior. Master You said: “It is a
rare thing for someone who has a sense of filial and fraternal responsibility (xiaodi 孝弟)
to have a taste for defying authority. And it is unheard of for those who have no taste for
defying authority to be keen on initiating rebellion” (Analects 1.2). What is translated as
1 The Jesuits who first brought his teachings to Europe Latinized Master Kong’s name to Confucius (for a
controversial but interesting work on the Jesuit’s “invention” of the presumably historical figure of
Confucius, see Jensen 1997). In the Chinese context, the tradition of which Master Kong is the key figure is
known as Rujia 儒家. I take the Lunyu 論語 (Analects) to contain the most authentic core teachings of the
Master still available to us. The first Latin translation of the Lunyu was published in the seventeenth century
(Couplet 1687). Unless otherwise stated, citations from the text are from Ames and Rosemont 1998.
138 TAN Sor-hoon
“defying authority” above, “fanshang 犯上,” may also be rendered as “transgressing
against superiors.” According to Master Kong, among the things exemplary persons (junzi
君子) detest were “those subordinates who would malign their superiors” (Analects
17.24). In early Chinese texts, “junzi 君子” could also be translated as “little Lord” or “the
Lord’s son,” and D.C. Lau’s (1979) translation of the Analects uses “gentleman” in its archaic
English sense capturing both actual social status and excellence in behavior: a gentleman
born may not be gentlemanly in behavior, while one born to a lower social status may behave
in a gentlemanly manner. Emphasizing the junzi’s older meaning of aristocratic status would
support an authoritarian interpretation of Confucianism. I shall contend that, although Master
Kong lived in an authoritarian age, where the model of hierarchical authority prevailed, and
such a model has continued to prevail even today in many East Asian societies claiming a
Confucian legacy, Master Kong’s teachings and conduct in the Analects offer an alternative
model of the authoritative as an implicit critique of authoritarianism.
Comparisons using shang and xia to indicate inequality among people do not always
refer to, let alone defend, existing social hierarchy. For example, they may be used to refer
to different human abilities:
Confucius said, “Knowledge (zhi 知) acquired through a natural propensity for it is its
highest level; knowledge acquired through study is the next highest; something
learned in response to difficulties encountered is again the next highest. But those
among the common people who do not learn even when vexed with difficulties—they
are at the bottom of the heap.” (Analects 16.9, see also 17.3)
There are times when superiority and inferiority pertain to ethical distinctions rather than to
social hierarchy: “The exemplary person takes the high road (shangda 上達), while the petty
person takes the low (xiada 下達)” (Analects 14.23, see also 14.35). The authority implied
in such ethical superiority is what Carter calls “the authority of wisdom,” which is
authoritative, not authoritarian.
The authoritarian and the authoritative are not always clearly separated in aristocratic
societies: “the social order tended to assimilate the two kinds of authority in a single role”
(Carter 1979: 7). Insofar as authority as the authoritative is distinguished from mere power
by some concept of legitimacy, that is, requiring justification of power, for example by
wisdom or some other excellence—the authority that seems inherent in the hierarchy may
also be dependent on those occupying higher positions in the hierarchy being superior in
ways that legitimize their positions and justify the accompanying power. Such a concept of
legitimacy is evident not only in the above mentioned use of shang and xia to make
comparisons in ethical achievements, but also in the standards Master Kong set for those in
superior positions. The Master said, “What could I see in a person who in holding a
position of influence [shang上] is not tolerant, who in observing ritual propriety (li 禮) is
not respectful and in overseeing the mourning rites does not grieve?” (Analects 3.26).
Misconduct at the top is more to blame for breakdown of authority and social order than
any inadequacy of the masses below. If those occupying higher positions in a hierarchy fail
to set a good example, then those below should not be blamed for bad behavior, including
crime and rebellion.
When the head of the Meng Clan appointed YANG Fu as a magistrate, he sought
advice from Master Zeng. Master Zeng said, “With their superiors having lost the
way (dao 道), the common people have since scattered. In uncovering what really
happened in criminal cases, you should take pity on them and show them sympathy
rather than being pleased with yourself” (Analects 19.19).
Authoritative Master Kong (Confucius) in An Authoritarian Age 139
3 Obedience to Authority
In the relation between superior and inferior, the latter is often expected to obey the
former’s command—obedience is implied by authority. In criticizing the petty ambition of
FAN Chi, who wanted to learn farming and gardening, Master Kong remarked,
If their superiors cherished the observance of ritual (li 禮), none among the common
people would dare to be disrespectful; if their superiors cherished appropriate conduct
(yi 義), none among the common people would dare to be disobedient (bu fu 不服); if
their superiors cherished making good on their word (xin 信), none among the
common people would dare to be duplicitous. (Analects 13.4)
People would cease to obey those above them in a given hierarchy when “superiors”
forfeited legitimacy by inappropriate conduct—when superiors lose their authority. This
implies that obedience is not always unquestioning, but dependent on the conduct of those
expecting or demanding obedience meeting some independent standards. Superior position
alone does not entitle one to authority; it is excellence in conduct, de 德, which is the basis
of authority in the Master’s teachings.
Other occurrences of “fu 服” in the Analects, which is the term translated as “obedience”
in the above passage, bear out the requirement of voluntary compliance in true authority. It
is used to mean sons and younger brothers “contributing their energies when there is work
to be done” as conduct commonly accepted as filial but considered inadequate in Master
Kong’s assessment, for whom true filiality lies in “showing the proper countenance”
(Analects 2.8). In the larger political context, Master Kong singled out the “submission” of
the Zhou for praise: “The Zhou, with two thirds of the world in its possession, continued to
submit to (fu 服) and serve the House of Yin. The excellence (de 德) of Zhou can be said to
be the highest excellence of all” (Analects 8.20).
Zhou’s “submission” is clearly voluntary, given that it had grown more powerful than its
overlord. Critics might say that the Master seems to make a virtue of submission itself, as
these two passages do not clearly indicate that the voluntary compliance was based on
recognition of excellence on the part of those in authority (elder brothers, fathers, and
overlords). On the contrary, Zhou was able to acquire “two-thirds of the world” precisely
because the Shang overlord had lost moral influence over those who turned to the more
virtuous Zhou rulers. This shift of the moral center of gravity eventually resulted in the
“mandate of heaven” being removed from the Shang to the Zhou royal house (at least
according to the Zhou account). One could argue from this larger picture that Master
Kong’s approval of the Zhou dynasty in general indicates that he believed that power
should be given to the virtuous, and is only legitimized into authority by virtue. On the
other hand, if one reads the above passage as simply advocating submission to de facto
authority without requiring justification of power, it would imply hierarchical authority and
support an authoritarian interpretation of Confucianism. The latter is a narrow view that
fails to pay enough attention to both historical context and other parts of the text. The rest
of this paper shall challenge this authoritarian interpretation and show why rejecting it for a
more sympathetic reading of Confucius’ views on authority hold useful lessons for the
modern age.
Other passages indicate that, with true authority—understood as power legitimized by
virtue—not only should obedience be voluntary, but it should be won by virtuous conduct:
Duke Ai of Lu inquired of Confucius, asking: “What does one do to gain the
allegiance (fu) of the people?” Confucius replied: “Raise up the true and place them
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over the crooked, and the allegiance of the people will be yours; raise up the crooked
and place them over the true, and the people will not be yours.” (Analects 2.19)
When his student RAN You failed to remonstrate with the Ji Clan against the latter’s
intended attack on its vassal state, Master Kong pointed out the proper way for those in
power to gain obedience or submission: “Under these circumstances [of equity, harmony,
and security], if distant populations are still not won over (fu), they persuade them to join
them through the cultivation of their refinement (wen 文) and excellence (de 德), and once
they have joined them, they make them secure” (Analects 16.1). In the Master’s eyes, it was
wrong of the Ji Clan to force even its own vassal into submission.
Master Kong’s disapproval of the use of force or threat of coercion throughout the
Analects reinforces the argument for defining authority as Carter defines it, “in
contradistinction to force,” that is, not as the authoritarian, but as the authoritative.
The Master said, “Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng 政) and
keep them orderly with penal laws (xing刑), and they will avoid punishments but will
be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de 德), keep them orderly
through observing ritual propriety (li 禮), and they will develop a sense of shame, and
moreover, will order themselves.” (Analects 2.3)
JI Kangzi asked Confucius about governing effectively (zheng 政), saying, “What if I
kill those who have abandoned the way (dao 道) to attract those who are on it?” “If
you govern effectively,” Confucius replied, “what need is there for killing? If you
want to be truly adept (shan 善), the people will also be adept. The excellence (de 德)
of the exemplary person (junzi 君子) is the wind; while that of the petty person is the
grass. As the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend.” (Analects 12.19)
Some might be tempted to argue that the action of the wind could be considered “forceful”
in that the grass does not choose to bend. This would be pressing the metaphor too hard.
The key point in this analogy is that grass is not harmed by this bending, and it is as natural
for grass to bend in the wind as it is for grass to grow straight, or toward the source of
sunlight. This metaphor from nature is significant in emphasizing what is “so-of-itself”
(ziran 自然), which also represents the spontaneous in Chinese thinking.
De-emphasizing choice in favor of benefit of the subject to coercion opens up space for
paternalism—and it has been argued that Confucian governments could not avoid being more
paternalistic, and justifiably so by their political ethics, than Western liberal democracies, for
example. In coercing others for their own good, paternalism is authoritarian. One could argue
against interpreting the above passage as justifying paternalism by making a case that the
benefit brought about through paternalistic means does not outweigh the harm it does by
depriving those who are supposed to benefit of their spontaneity, and possibly rendering them
too dependent. Even if one concedes that there is a tendency to paternalism in Confucianism,
one could still maintain that paternalism could not be pushed too far on Confucian grounds
because its concern is moral transformation which could not be brought about by force alone.
Force could at best be used as a temporary measure, and only if there is reason in each specific
case to believe it would contribute to an appreciation of the good aimed at, and eventually
voluntary compliance would render force unnecessary.
Another term in the Analects associated with obedience is “cong 從,” often translated as
“following” as in “following orders.”
JI Ziran inquired, “Can Zhongyu and Ranyou be called great ministers?” The Master
replied, “I expected you to ask about other people, but then you ask about Zhongyu
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and Ranyou. What are called great ministers are those who serve their lord with the
way (dao 道), and when they cannot, resign. Now as for Zhongyu and Ranyou, they
can be called ‘place holder’ ministers.” “Such being the case, can they be counted on
to obey orders?” JI Ziran asked. The Master replied, “Even they would stop short of
patricide or regicide.” (Analects 11.24)
Master Kong was against unquestioning obedience to superiors. One should not obey
unethical orders; indeed one should leave the employ of unethical superiors. Ideally,
authority lies not in any existing socio-political hierarchy but in the excellence of those in
authority. The Master said, “If people are proper (zheng 正) in personal conduct, others will
follow suit without need of command. But if they are not proper, even when they
command, others will not obey [cong 從]” (Analects 13.6). True authority is freely accepted
and brings voluntary compliance.
The term “cong 从” has broader usage than “fu 服.” It could refer to one event following
another (Analects 2.13, 3.23); “following” one’s desires or preferences (Analects 2.4, 7.12);
following or heeding someone’s suggestions or words (Analects 4.18, 9.24). It is often used
in the phrase “congzheng 從政” to mean joining or taking part in politics or government
(Analects 4.13, 6.8, 13.13, 13.20, 18.5, 20.2). In comparison with fu, cong is also less
hierarchical—it sometimes means “joining” or “accompanying” someone who does not
necessarily occupy a superior position. Those following the Master could be said to follow
someone above them in a hierarchy of students below teachers. This hierarchy is one
implicitly justified by inequality of knowledge, expertise, or wisdom. Master Kong was not
the only possible teacher, as made clear in the advice Zilu received from a recluse to follow
“a teacher who avoids the world altogether” rather than one who only “avoids people
selectively” (Analects 18.6). Master Kong’s students followed him because they believed
him to be a superior teacher to others. He was “above” them because he had established his
authority as an authoritative model through his excellence; his position as teacher per se did
not force his students to follow him.
Master Kong was not an authoritarian teacher who expected unquestioning obedience or
agreement from his students. Rather than being pleased that YAN Hui never objected (wei 違)
to anything he said, he was worried that YAN Hui was “slow” (yu愚) (Analects 2.9). The only
time he chided this favorite student, whom he considered superior to himself in wisdom
(Analects 5.9), was when he complained, “YAN Hui is of no help to me. There is nothing that
I say that he doesn’t like” (Analects 11.4). In the authoritative model of authority, advice is to
be accepted or followed only after due consideration, and is considered to be effective only if
it contributes to the self-cultivation and growth of all involved:2
TheMaster said, “If the way does not prevail in the land, and I had to take to the high seas
on a raft, the person who would follow me I expect would be Zilu.” Zilu on hearing of
this was delighted. The Master said, “With Zilu, his boldness certainly exceeds mine, but
he brings nothing with him from which to build the raft.” (Analects 5.7)
What Master Kong looked for in his students was learning that enabled them to grow in
excellence and therefore to contribute to the cooperative project of ethical living in which
teacher and students are engaged. D.C. Lau’s slightly different translation has the Master
criticizing Zilu as “lacking in judgment” (Lau 1979: 77). This means that a student who is
willing to follow her teacher without question, or without any thought of contributing to the
2 For more detailed discussion of how the Analects show that an ideal authority relation requires both parties
to participate in shaping means and ends to be shared, contribute to one another’s personal cultivation and to
communal harmony, see TAN Sor-hoon 2004: 190–91.
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cooperative enterprise beyond following, is not necessarily praiseworthy. Even if the
teacher is not leading the student astray, the student should act only when she understands
why she is joining the teacher, and considers whether she should do so in view of possible
consequences, and how she will contribute to their enterprise.
Master Kong did not advocate blindly following anyone, whatever his or her position.
He taught his students to follow others’ strengths but not their weaknesses; instead, one
should identify others’ weaknesses in order to reform oneself (Analects 7.22). He himself
“followed Zhou” only after making a considered judgment about its relative superiority to
other earlier dynasties from which the Zhou had learned (Analects 3.14). On a different
occasion, rather than following Zhou totally and without question, he selected specific
practices from different dynasties as making up “a viable state (weibang 為邦)” (Analects
15.11). In his own learning, Master Kong “selected what works and then followed it”
(Analects 7.28). He did not blindly follow past practices nor was he a slave to novelty. He
followed not without question, but selectively, only after critical assessment.
The Master said, “The use of a hemp cap is prescribed in the observance of ritual
practice (li 禮). Nowadays, that a silk cap is used instead is a matter of frugality. I
would follow accepted practice on this. A subject kowtowing on entering the hall is
prescribed in the observance of ritual practice (li 禮). Nowadays that one kowtows
only after ascending the hall is a matter of hubris. Although it goes contrary [wei 違]
to accepted practice, I still kowtow on entering the hall.” (Analects 9.3)
In two of the passages quoted above (Analects 2.9, 9.3), “following or obeying (cong
從)” occurs as the opposite of “contrary to (wei 違),” which occurs in another passage, in
which Master Kong not only did not advocate unquestioning obedience to those in
authority, but actually considered it very dangerous for rulers to desire and enjoy
unquestioning obedience:
There is the saying, “I find little pleasure in ruling, save that no one will take
exception [wei 違] to what I say.” If what one has to say is efficacious (shan 善) and
no one takes exception, fine indeed. But if what one has to say is not efficacious and
no one takes exception, is this not close to ruining a state? (Analects 13.15)
This implies that, to contribute to good government and the welfare of the state, one should
object to or disobey whatever is unethical on the part of those in authority, notwithstanding
their power over oneself.
It might seem that Master Kong had a different attitude toward contradicting or
disobeying parental authority. The Master said, “In serving your father and mother,
remonstrate with them gently. On seeing that they do not heed your suggestions, remain
respectful and do not act contrary [buwei 不違]. Although concerned, voice no resentment”
(Analects 4.18). There is reason to doubt if this is defending absolute obedience. First, the
need to “remonstrate” already means that obedience is not unquestioning; and it is not clear
that “do not act contrary” means “do not disobey even erring parents,” whatever the
commands. Instead, it would be more consistent with Master Kong’s understanding of the
relation between the family and the larger society, vis-à-vis the cultivation of moral
character, to read this ambiguous passage in line with the passages explicitly stating that
there are commands a subordinate should not obey. The Analects views filial piety as the
basis of other virtues with a wider social reach such as ren, and implies that the attitudes
toward authority learned in the family govern behavior toward authorities outside the
family (Analects 1.2). If so, requiring children to obey their parents regardless of how
wrong the latter might be would make it impossible or at least very difficult for these
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individuals, as subordinates, to stand up to unethical superiors as Master Kong insisted they
should.
In the abovementioned Analects 4.18, what the son should not act contrary to may be
some ethical standard independent of and higher than his parents’ fallible wishes. This is
made explicit on a different occasion when the topic of discussion is also filial conduct.
MENG Yizi asked about filial conduct (xiao 孝). The master said, “Do not act contrary
[wuwei 無違].” FAN Chi was driving the Master’s chariot, and the Master informed
him further… “While they are living, serve them according to the observances of
ritual propriety (li 禮); when they are dead, bury them and sacrifice to them according
to the observances of ritual propriety.” (Analects 2.5)
Thus, even in the case of parental authority, we find a model of the authoritative bringing
voluntary compliance and obedience to the excellence of ritual propriety, the model of
exemplary ethical conduct, instead of the authoritarian requiring unquestioning obedience
to those in hierarchical positions of authority even when their commands are unethical.
Some might see the requirement for sons to follow their fathers’ ways even after the
latter’s death as a highly authoritarian conservatism: “A person who for three years refrains
from reforming (gai 改) the ways of his late father can be called a filial son (xiao 孝)”
(Analects 1.11, 4.20). Rather than the grip of a parent’s authority on his child, this passage
could be observing that one who cherishes one’s parent’s memory as a filial child would not
be in a hurry to erase all signs of their existence, and replacing a departed parent’s ways
with one’s own before the three years of mourning is over would show an egoistic
arrogance and disregard for the departed. Where a parent’s way might be so harmful that
adhering to it for three more years might be unethical, one could read the passage to mean
that in such a case, even if a filial child had to act differently from her parent, she would not
highlight the fact, might even deny any change has been made—this is not so much
deception of self or others, as a kind of li 禮 that also applies when one avoids blurting out a
truth that might hurt people’s feelings and serve no other purpose.
Some translators interpret this remark as requiring adherence to one’s late father’s ways
even beyond three years—that is, it would be unlikely for one who refrained from
“changing (gai 改)” his late father’s ways in the first three years to deviate from them
thereafter. Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont disagree, choosing to read this remark to
mean that a son “must honor the ritual traditions seriously, but then must re-appropriate
them for himself, and in the course of time attune them to make them appropriate to his
own particular circumstances” (Ames and Rosemont: 280–81). Rather than the first three
years setting a pattern of blind obedience for the future, the three years allow attentive
judgment and practice to guide change. This reading is more in tune with the
recommendation to “follow and reform” in Analects 9.24:
The Master said, “How could one but comply with (cong 從) what model sayings
have to say? But the real value lies in reforming (gai 改) one’s ways. How could one
but find pleasure in polite language? But the real value lies in drawing out its
meaning. What can possibly be done with people who find pleasure in polite
language but do not draw out its meaning, or ones who comply with model sayings
but do not reform their ways.”
Even when following what is exemplary, the value of obedience or compliance lies in
appropriating the model for one’s particular situation in order to reform oneself, thereby
uniquely embodying what has been passed down in ways that revitalize the heritage. Only
then is the authority of parents truly authoritative, not only in the voluntariness of their
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children’s compliance but also in its contribution to their children’s and others’ self-
cultivation.
4 Translations of “Authority” and Connotations
I have been focusing on discussions of obedience and disobedience in the Analects in order to
understand Master Kong’s attitude to authority. More directly, is “authority” ever discussed
explicitly? In modern Mandarin, “authority” is usually translated in a few ways: quanli 權力,
quanwei 權威, or weiquan 威權. The term “quanli” is used for both “power” and “authority,”
and the second character li 力, meaning “effort, strength, or force,” gives it connotations of
requiring such means of enforcement, or power legitimized by the ability to hold it. The
“authoritative,” as in “an authority” or expert on some subject-matter, is usually translated as
“quanwei,” although this also translates “authority” in general, as when “authoritarianism” is
translated as “quanwei zhuyi 權威主義.” By reversing the two characters, “weiquan”
emphasizes the commanding and power aspect of authority since “wei 威,” which on its own
could mean “power, might, or strength,” also means “awe-inspiring, majestic, or commanding.”
While there is no explicit discussion of “quanli,” “quanwei,” or “weiquan” in the Analects,
the characters that made up these terms do occur separately in the text. It was said that “The
Master had nothing to say about strange happenings, the use of force (li 力), disorder or the
spirits” (Analects 7.21). Master Kong considered wei 威 a desirable quality an exemplary
person should acquire. “Exemplary persons (junzi 君子) lacking in gravity would have no
dignity (wei 威)” (Analects 1.8). It is noteworthy that he contrasted “wei 威” with “meng 猛,”
meaning “ferocity or severity” (Analects 7.38, 20.2); the undesirable nature of “meng 猛” is
indicated by its association with bestiality or brutality through its “犭” radical and its usage in
descriptions such as “ferocious beasts (mengshou 猛獸).” This adjective was also used to
describe tyrannical government in the Book of Rites.3 The dignity that commands awe and
voluntary compliance through appreciation of excellence must be distinguished from fear of
that which is not amenable to reason, such as brute force. In the early texts, the basic meaning
of “quan” is “weight” (of a steelyard) or “weighing” (Analects 20.1). It is used in the sense of
“weighing things up” to refer metaphorically to the exercise of judgment or discretion
(Analects 9.30, 18.8). Against this background, to translate “authoritarianism” as “quanwei
zhuyi 權威主義” gives it connotations of judgment and discretion inspiring awe and dignity, or
providing the basis for strength and power—quite different from the connotations of
“authoritarianism” in modern Western political discourse, which means unlimited and often
unjustified power exercised by government through coercive means. This may partly explain
why “authoritarianism” does not meet with the same kind of antagonism among
contemporary Chinese intellectuals.
5 Authoritative Teachings but Authoritarian Practice?
If the model of authority in Master Kong’s teachings was the authoritative, how has the
philosophy the West named after him ended up representing East Asian autocracy and
3 The Book of Rites (Li Ji 禮記) tells a story of Master Kong meeting a woman whose uncle, husband, and
finally her son had been killed by tigers. When asked why she had not left the area, she replied, “there is no
tyrannical government (kezheng 苛政).” Master Kong then instructed his students, “harsh governments are
more ferocious (meng 猛) than tigers” (“tangong 檀弓” part II, juan 11; Sun Xidan 1989: 1.292).
Authoritative Master Kong (Confucius) in An Authoritarian Age 145
authoritarianism? The problem is not simply a matter of practice failing to live up to theory
or the philosophical ideal, although that is part of it. It is rooted in the compelling need of
members of that tradition to have practical impact on their respective times. Master Kong’s
ideals are not easy to realize; his own attempts won him the reputation of being “one who
keeps trying although he knows it is in vain” (Analects 14.38). The Master was not so
idealistic that he was completely free from the pressure of wanting to make a difference in
practice, and on at least one occasion incurred his student Zilu’s disapproval with his
willingness to help someone with dubious ethics, if it offered an opportunity to put his
ideals into practice (Analects 17.5).
In an imperfect world, the excellence of the authoritative is not always appreciated and
voluntary compliance may not be forthcoming. This is problematic in the political context, as
Carter observes, “The concept of effectiveness is indispensable to political authority, which
cannot in its nature be demonstrated solely by the objective value of its decisions unless people
also comply with them” (Carter 1979: 48). Under imperfect circumstances, it is always
tempting for governments, even when they professed Confucian ideals, to employ coercion
“for the good” of others and even for those coerced, and hence fall into the trap of believing
that “the end justifies the means.” As with the earlier discussion of paternalism, a Confucian
might justify authoritarian acts as temporary means, but in order not to betray her ethical
ideals, these means must be strictly temporary and guided by those ethical ideals.
Unfortunately, not only is there a temptation to “prolong” the temporary indefinitely, there
is always a danger that one who resorts to such means is not virtuous enough not to be
corrupted by the exercise of such power, and eventually adopts authoritarianism as an end
rather than a means. For the most part, the Analects shows that Master Kong himself managed
to resist or avoid that trap, and even when he conceded the necessity of undesirable means
such as punitive laws or litigation to solve social problems (Analects 12.13), he made it clear
that any use of coercion is a failure of authority.4 As political chaos increased after Master
Kong’s death (479 BCE), it becamemore andmore difficult for his followers not to compromise
their ideals in the name of political realism. Even in more stable times, after Confucians had
gained access to political power, officials with genuine Confucian aspirations still had trouble
avoiding compromising their ethical ideals for political survival or effectiveness.
When it comes to dealing with this difficulty of realizing ideals in an imperfect reality, where
might often does triumph over right, the key transition in the tradition occurred with Master
Xun (Xunzi 荀子 298-38 BCE), whose pessimistic view of human nature led him to
emphasize the role of coercion in maintaining social order: “Encourage them with
commendations and rewards; chastise them with rebukes and punishments… Those who
employ their talents in conduct opposed to what is proper to the occasion should be
condemned to death without mercy” (Knoblock 1988–1994: II.94). Not only did he disagree
with Master Kong about the use of killing in government, Master Xun went beyond
advocating this as “a necessary evil” to describe it as “heaven’s power (de 德)—such is the
government of the true king” (Knoblock 1988–1994: II.95).5 He emphasized the need for a
good government to “enrich the country” and “strengthen arms” for the people’s security and
welfare—coercive means are justified in the pursuit of these purposes. Michael Twohey
4 For a nuanced discussion of whether use of force strengthens authority or is a failure of authority, see Carter
1979: 45–49.
5 It should be noted that there is some consensus that, unlike Master Kong and Master Meng, Master Xun did
not understand heaven (tian 天) as a moral authority but as “an impersonal force of Nature, or as natural or
universal law.” This, however is challenged by Eno and Machle (Eno 1990:131; Machle 1993: 21–27, 167–
78). For a more detailed discussion of the role of coercion and authority in imperfect situations, with a focus
on Xunzi’s views, see Tan: 194–98.
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argues, “If a development strategy in Asia is described as Confucian-inspired, only the Xunzi
among the ancient Confucian texts proposes an authoritarian system of rule that is similar to
that strategy as it has been applied in Singapore, Taiwan, and possibly in post-Mao China”
(Twohey 1999: 27).
Twohey’s thesis that “Xunzi’s outlook was central to China’s modern reformers when
they justified the necessity of a development strategy that was driven by a strong
authoritarian leadership” is interesting and very persuasive (Twohey 1999: 28).6 However,
he overlooks the very different model of authority as the authoritative implicit in the
Analects when he includes Confucius among those advocating an ethically-based
authoritarian system of rule for the purpose of welfare and security. I would also contend
that, despite the presence of authoritarian elements, the view of authority as authoritative
remains a strong presence in some chapters of the Xunzi; for example, in the discussion of
the “Way of the Ministers (chendao 臣道),” which requires good ministers to be able to
disagree with and disobey the ruler for the good of the ruler and the state: “One should
follow the Way and not follow the lord” (Knoblock 1988–1994: II.200).
The legitimation of the authoritarian system of rule Twohey discusses is only
superficially Confucian. It is true that Master Kong believed that a good government must
ensure the security and basic welfare of the people (Analects 13.9); however, his ideal of
“virtuous rule” does not end with that but also requires education and moral transformation
of the people once basic peace and livelihood have been obtained. The question a
Confucian should ask is whether an authoritarian system legitimated by physical security
and economic prosperity alone could provide the conditions for citizens to cultivate
themselves according to the Master’s teachings. I would argue that submission to such a
system is self-interested in a way that encourages motivations that take one further away
from virtue (de 德) and Confucius’ way (dao 道); it encourages respect not for true
authority, which lies in the ethically authoritative, but for strength and effectiveness in
achieving military, economic and political goals which may not be Confucian in spirit. In an
authoritarian age, it is all too common for any teachings that value authority to be perverted
into defense of authoritarianism. It is vital to the future of Confucianism to save Master
Kong’s teachings about the authoritative from such perversion.
6 Rescuing Confucianism from Authoritarian Practice
To rescue Confucianism from the taint of authoritarianism would require more than
insisting on its “philosophical purity” by defending an interpretation of the Analects which
has a conception of authority as authoritative. Given the importance of practice to
Confucians, and the fact that the risk and temptation to slide into the authoritarian are ever
present in the transition from theory to practice, something needs to be said about rescuing
Confucian political practice from authoritarianism. To get a grip on this problem, one needs
to acknowledge that Confucian efforts to moralize politics, their insistence that politics and
ethics are not separate in the sense that a good government is a government of virtue, while
laudable, sometimes display inadequate understanding of the actual phenomena of politics.
Confucianism needs to take seriously the autonomy of the political, not in the sense that
6 Twohey prefers the Xunzi to the Analects and the Mencius, which he criticizes as vague and “marred by
abstractions and contradictions” (Twohey 1999: 18). However, he reads the same authoritarian message in all
the early Confucian texts. As with other authoritarian interpretations of Confucianism, Twohey’s work is
marred by too superficial a reading of these texts.
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ethical demands and standards cannot be applied to politics at all—they could and should
be so applied—but in the sense that one cannot approach political authority the way one
approaches authority in ethical activities that do not involve the relation between those who
rule and those who are ruled.
In moral cultivation, the optimistic assumption that “everyone could be a sage” helps to
strengthen one’s aspiration to ethical actions and sagely character and moves one to ethical
achievements. To assume that any one could be a sage in politics leaves one vulnerable to
the naïve hope for an enlightened ruler who would govern well without any oversight and
restrain himself or herself from abusing his/her power even in the absence of external
constraints. History of societies in both East and West shows how forlorn is such a hope. In
ethical endeavors, teaching, and learning, authority is established as the authoritative in one
whom others voluntarily emulate. In politics, authority is often established first by the
strength to seize and hold power and later legitimized by formal procedures historically
established and accepted by a political community. Effective political authority is backed by
the means to enforce decisions when voluntary compliance is not forthcoming. Even
though justification is often required and legitimacy could introduce the authoritative into
political authority, the relation between the authoritative and political effectiveness is
inherently problematic and quite unlike that between the authoritative and ethical
achievement. The use of coercion only brings external compliance which does not meet
the criteria of ethical action—it could at most be an external means, which leads to the
external form of ethical action, and only when coercion could be dispensed with would we
recognize someone to be acting ethically; only then is the action ethical in both form and
content. In the political realm, the use of coercion (actual or threatened) is unavoidable
when people more often than not act selfishly at others’ expense; maintaining peace and
order, let alone achieving broader well-being, cannot rely on voluntary actions alone.
A pessimistic view of human nature is much more appropriate to the political realm.
However, instead of applying this assumption to the general masses, Confucians today
should focus on the inevitable imperfection of actual and potential governments, and
embrace Lord Acton’s maxim that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely.” Confucian ethical aspiration alone will not be sufficient to counter the
temptation and risk of the authoritative degenerating into the authoritarian in the move into
the political realm and the transition between theory and practice. Neither exhortation to
governments to govern virtuously nor the best leadership training and selection programs
will guarantee freedom from oppression. Authoritarian practice could be avoided only by,
inter alia, de-centralizing power to ensure that no one individual, no one group, has a
monopoly of unlimited power; putting in place institutional constraints on political power;
establishing official institutions of oversight as well as nurturing civil society organizations
with the capacity to scrutinize and hold governments accountable for their actions;
encouraging and enabling ordinary citizens to take an interest in politics, to be willing and
able to hold their government accountable and to remove bad governments without
bloodshed and chaos. In other words, rescuing Confucianism from authoritarianism in
practice requires democratization of Confucianism. However, this does not mean turning
Confucian societies into liberal democracies similar to the United States or other European
democracies; the aim should be distinctively Confucian democracies.7
7 This conclusion opens up an even larger topic, which cannot be dealt with in depth here. Besides Tan’s
Confucian Democracy, there are several other discussions on the compatibility of Confucianism and
democracy, including the works of HE Xinquan (1996); TAN Yuanping (2004); LI Minghui (2005); LI
Chenyang (1999: chapter 7; 2007); and Daniel A. Bell (2006).
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